I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2010, Voltage Pictures initiated a lawsuit against 5000 John Doe defendants for illegally distributing the Academy Award-winning movie The Hurt Locker. 1 In April 2011, Voltage Pictures amended its original complaint bringing the total number of defendants to 24,595.
2
While a lawsuit against 24,595 individuals is alarming, by the end of 2011, more than 250,000 individuals had been sued for similar alleged acts. 3 This trend becomes unfathomable when one considers that these lawsuits only involve a micro-fraction of the intellectual property being illegally traded on the Internet. 4 This Article follows the ongoing saga of The Hurt Locker litigation to illuminate the issues that arise in mass litigation of copyright claims.
On June 26, 2009, The Hurt Locker was released in movie theaters in the United States. 5 Despite winning six Academy Awards, 6 the film grossed only $16.4 million in the theatrical box office-a disappointing return against a $15 million production budget. 7 Thousands of copy-Had Voltage Pictures only sued the 5000 Does named in the original complaint, 15 and 75 percent of the defendants could be identified, 16 were sued, and chose to settle 17 for $2900, 18 the litigation would generate $10.9 million. Reports suggest that the plaintiffs will receive 30 percent 19 of the $10.9 million-$3.3 million. This creates such strong incentives to litigate 20 that one may question whether an enforcement-based business model can be reconciled with the purposes of copyright law.
When the U.S. Supreme Court was called upon to illuminate the purposes of copyright, the Court found that the "purpose of copyright [law] is to create incentives for creative effort." 21 Unfortunately, copyright owners and attorneys have discovered unintended "incentives"-incentives to litigate-and are using their "creative effort" to craft profitable litigation strategies. This is not the creativity the Framers had in mind when they wrote in the Constitution that Congress could enact laws that "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 22 Statutory damages distort incentives to create new works and reward companies that litigate over existing works, which are no longer, or never were, commercially viable.
U.S. copyright law attempts to create incentives to create new works, but, in reality, the promise of statutory damages creates an incentive to monetize a work though litigation even when the infringement results in nominal damage to the copyright holder. This . 17 See Anderson, supra note 13 (suggesting ninety percent of targets will settle). 18 19 Enigmax, Rights Holders Get 30% from Mass BitTorrent Litigation, TORRENTFREAK (Mar. 31, 2010), http://torrentfreak.com/rights-holders-get-30-from-mass-bittorrent-litigation-100331/. 20 An additional $3.3 million in profit would increase the movie's domestic gross by about twenty percent. See Moya, supra note 7. 21 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984) . 22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Article demonstrates how plaintiffs are monetizing infringement by enforcing copyrights though a litigation-based business model. Part II explains how the 1976 Copyright Act created incentives to litigate as a business model. Part III illuminates some of the issues surrounding mass copyright litigation, using The Hurt Locker litigation as an example. Part IV discusses various strategies to combat this type of litigation. Lastly, Part V concludes that the most effective and equitable way to handle copyright enforcement in the Internet Age is to remove statutory damages from the U.S. copyright law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Copyright Act of 1976
The Constitution grants Congress the power to create laws to protect authors' rights in their works. 23 The Constitution provides that " [t] he Congress shall have Power To . . . promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 24 The 1976 Copyright Act (the Copyright Act) governs copyright protections for works created after 1977. 25 The Copyright Act protects "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression," such as motion pictures and sound recordings. 26 These protections give copyright holders various rights, including the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, or prepare derivative works from the copyrighted work. 27 The Copyright Act also provides damages for infringement of an owner's rights. 28 A copyright holder can elect for either the actual damages caused by the infringement as well as the profits the infringer generated, or for statutory damages. 29 Statutory damages generally range from $750 to $30,000. 30 If the court finds the infringement will- 23 Id. 24 Id. 25 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) . 26 Id. 27 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(3). 28 17 U.S.C. § 504. 29 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1) . 30 Id.
ful, it has the discretion to raise the statutory award to as much as $150,000. 31 On the other hand, statutory damage awards can be as low as $200 if the defending party can prove that it was unaware that its acts infringed on the owner's copyrights.
32
Because the copyright holder has the choice between statutory damages and actual damages, and statutory damages will often be significantly higher than actual damages, the copyright holder will likely select statutory damages.
B. A Deterrence-Based Litigation Model: Early Litigation Strategies of the RIAA
Blaming file sharing over peer-to-peer networks for sharp declines in sales, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) employed a litigation strategy to curb the illegal distribution of its content on the Internet. 33 Initially, the strategy focused on litigating against peer-to-peer software providers, such as Napster, 34 for facilitating infringement.
35
The RIAA succeeded in shutting down Napster in 2000, but this just prompted users to switch to new networks that lacked centralized servers. 36 Facing difficulty in suing companies that offered services without centralized servers, 37 the RIAA began to sue individual infringers. 38 However, the lawsuits against individuals were largely seen as a failure. 39 The RIAA was unable to stop illegal downloading of copyrighted material-in fact, peer-to-peer 31 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 32 usage grew. 40 Furthermore, the lawsuits cost the record companies the goodwill of consumers and became a "money pit." 41 In a five-year period the RIAA spent roughly $90 million on legal fees to recover only $2.5 million. 42 In 2008, the RIAA ended its strategy of deterrence through litigation. 43 Instead, the RIAA now works directly with certain Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to send notices to infringing users. 44 After witnessing the RIAA's failure to deter infringement through litigation, commentators criticized the use of litigation to recover losses from file sharing as economically ineffective. 
C. A Profit-Based Litigation Model: The Rise of the Copyright Troll
A copyright troll is a plaintiff who seeks damages for infringement upon a copyright it owns, not to be made whole, but rather as a primary or supplemental revenue stream. 46 Although the term is just recently gaining widespread use, the practice of monetizing copyright infringement as a business model is over a century old. The first real copyright troll, Harry Wall, appeared in England in the 1870s. 47 Wall purchased "public performance rights" that were otherwise unenforced. 48 He then enforced those rights against infringers with a statutory penalty of 40 shillings.
49
This troll, like many that came after him, found that enforcing copyrights with a statutory penalty could be more profitable than creating new works. It is uncertain whether copyright enforcement was meant to protect a use where the original was not commercially successful, rights were not asserted until well after the commercial success of the derivative work, and the original is only used in a limited fashion. 63 Under these circumstances, statutory damages create a windfall for a minimally injured plaintiff. Motivated by copyright law incentives, sample trolls are able to make money simply by enforcing rights in old works without creating their own new works. 64 While sample trolling is a form of copyright trolling, sample trolls sue for actual damages rather than statutory damages because they are motivated by the commercial success of a derivative work. In contrast to sample trolls, statutory damages create incentives for another type of troll, the online news troll. For example, Righthaven LLC turned into a litigation-based business when it purchased the copyrights of various newspapers' content, notably content from the Las Vegas Review-Journal, and began to sue users that reposted old articles on other websites. 66 By July 2011, Righthaven had filed 276 lawsuits and recovered an estimated $352,500 in 141 settlements. 67 In their complaints, Righthaven sought permanent injunctions, statutory damages, attorney fees, and costs, and demanded ownership of the domain name of the infringing website. 68 Righthaven has been willing to settle for around $5000, 69 which is far less than the cost of hiring an attorney to defend against infringement claims, and it has the advantage of precluding the chance of losing at trial. 70 Therefore, it is not surprising that many Righthaven defendants were quick to settle, despite the possibility of a strong fair use 71 defense. 72 Righthaven, like a sample troll, uses copyright law, not to protect its property from unlicensed use, but rather to generate profit from that use even in the absence of articulable harm to Righthaven. Despite Righthaven's ability to generate income through its litigation model, the effort, like that of the RIAA, has been described as a failure. 73 Righthaven has been ordered to pay attorney's fees in several cases it pursued, including $116,718 for proceeding against a defendant without proper standing. Righthaven had been ordered to pay over $225,000 including legal fees and a $5000 sanction for misleading the court. 75 While these costs cut into Righthaven's profit margin, they do not disprove the Righthaven model. Because these costs do not represent a failure of Righthaven's substantive claims, Righthaven's mistakes merely caution others to follow correct procedure.
File Sharing: Mass-Litigation as a Business Model
Unlike sample trolls and online news trolls who sue individuals to recover lost profits from illegal distribution of the copyrighted work, Voltage Pictures sought statutory damages from unknown defendants for infringement of The Hurt Locker.
76
Dunlap, Grubb & Weaver, PLLC (DGW), 77 the firm that represented Voltage Pictures explained that the firm was "creating a revenue stream and monetizing the equivalent of an alternative distribution channel."
78 The Hurt Locker litigation may have been just a "test run" for DGW of an even higher volume mass-litigation model to generate profits through the threat of statutory damages. 79 Despite the possibility that some infringers will fight back in court, the copyright troll industry has been "multiplying like especially fertile rabbits" to scour the Internet in the hope of monetizing copyright infringement. 80 Nearly 100,000 Does were named in copyright lawsuits over a period of thirteen months, starting from January 1, 2010.
81
The numbers are staggering considering it took the RIAA five years to sue 35,000 individuals. 82 These defendants represent only part of the infringement of a handful of copyright properties, 83 evoking "floodgate" analogies if the copyright troll's mass litigation model gains widespread legal acceptance. The new mass-litigation model embraces infringement and removes the risk of loss from the copyright holder by employing a contingency fee structure. 84 In a reversal from the normal contingency fee structure, the client only keeps around 30 percent, while the law firm keeps the remaining 70 percent. 85 According to a company specializing in this type of litigation, this fee structure allows copyright holders to "monetize peer-to-peer (P2P) activity and realize revenues from an unexpected source-Internet piracy." 
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT MASS LITIGATION

87
A mass-litigation business model raises numerous procedural questions and issues at every step of the process, many of which have been answered in the course of The Hurt Locker litigation. This Part examines The Hurt Locker litigation to illuminate those issues that have been resolved, as well as those that remain. First, this Part addresses identification of possible defendants. Second, this Part discusses the methods copyright trolls employ to keep litigation costs down. Finally, this Part addresses the unequal bargaining positions of copyright trolls and defendants.
A. Identifying Infringement
The Internet has allowed copyrighted materials to propagate in ways that the Copyright Act's drafters could not have predicted. With the introduction of Internet peer-to-peer technologies, ordinary Internet users have gained the ability to become large-scale copyright infringers.
88 These peer-to-peer technologies revealed a gap between what the law proscribes and the norms that exist on the Internet, creating a "nation of constant infringers."
89
While peer-to-peer technologies facilitated widespread infringement, the structure of the Internet also made acts of infringement traceable through Internet protocol (IP) log databases generated by ISPs. 90 Every computer on the Internet is assigned an IP address that is used to locate and identify other computers.
91
In a peer-to-peer network, two computers connect via their IP addresses while one computer distributes a file (uploading) and the other computer receives the content (downloading).
92 IP addresses are not fixed to a particular user because most residential computers do not maintain the same IP 87 The purpose of this Part is to give the reader a better understanding of the way the availability of statutory damages is driving a new litigation strategy based on questionable legal ground and is a misuse of the legal system. 88 address indefinitely, but rather cycle through a finite list of IP addresses owned by the ISP. 93 To track an IP address, the ISP can determine which subscriber was assigned the IP address at a given time. 94 Therefore, to identify a suspected infringer, the copyright holder needs to supply a user's IP address and the time the infringement occurred to an ISP to learn the identity of the infringer. 95 To obtain the necessary data, DGW hired a company to monitor peer-to-peer networks for illegal distribution of The Hurt Locker.
96
The exact methods used to gather IP addresses are a tightly held trade secret, 97 but commentators have demonstrated simple and effective ways to gather this data. 98 The addresses are then checked for quality control and screened based on the chance of success. 99 At this point, the data merely consists of strings of numbers that still must be crossreferenced against an IP log to identify an unique individual. copyright holder's inability to identify the infringer by name creates quasi-anonymity that allows many file sharers to avoid detection.
101
While a copyright holder cannot identify the specific individual infringer based on an IP address, the information can be crossreferenced against IP log databases kept by ISPs to determine the identity of the subscriber. 102 Matching an IP address to an individual requires ISP cooperation to identify the subscriber that was using the particular IP address at the supplied time.
103 Not all ISPs have been willing to freely share this information, 104 and without the ISP's logs, copyright holders are unable to identify subscribers. 105 To compel records from an ISP, the copyright holder must first file a complaint to get the power to subpoena. 106 The complaint, therefore, is the gateway to identifying an infringer. 101 Thomas, supra note 45, at 719. 102 Tehranian, supra note 88, at 549. 
B. Cost Reduction Techniques for Litigation
Copyright trolls use different methods to keep litigation costs down. For example, plaintiffs like Righthaven file suits against defendants with known identities and use a system of pleading where a model complaint is reused as a template. 107 Alternately, plaintiffs, like Voltage Pictures, who only know the defendants' IP addresses, and not their identities, must file a lawsuit against each IP address to gain the power to subpoena ISPs for the records to match the addresses to identities. 108 The cost to file a complaint in federal court is $350, 109 but DGW saved about $1.75 million in filing fees by filing Voltage Pictures' claims in a single complaint.
110
This litigation model also requires a streamlined discovery process to identify alleged infringers. 111 The primary method copyright holders utilize to streamline the discovery process is using single complaints that name thousands of defendants, as Voltage Pictures did. Initially, the copyright holder must file a complaint naming each defendant as a "Doe" defendant. 112 Once the identity of the infringer is discovered, the complaint is amended to recognize the real party to the to obtain the identity of an alleged infringer before filing a complaint. Id. at 1232. not necessarily to litigate against 5000 individuals in a single trial.
119
As will become clearer after a discussion of the unequal positions between the copyright troll and defendant, 120 success at this stage is merely identification of the alleged infringer.
Defeating joinder may be a short-lived victory because the result would only be the severance of the misjoined parties. 121 The plaintiff would only have to re-file against each misjoined party. 122 While the cost of re-filing each complaint would be an additional $350, the plaintiff would already have the identity of the alleged infringer and could therefore pursue a settlement before re-filing. 123 Also, the court has the power to consolidate the actions after severance if the cases are in the same district and "involve a common question of law or fact." 124 Therefore, even if the defendant wins the joinder battle, in the end, the plaintiff still will have the power to subpoena the ISP.
C. Unequal Bargaining Power
The purpose of litigation in this circumstance is to seek settlements from identified infringers. 125 This Part investigates the unequal bargaining power between suspected infringers and copyright holders. sibility of outlandish statutory damages creates overwhelmingly strong incentives to settle.
Settlement Letter
The subpoena to the ISP is the copyright troll's most critical tool. The subpoena directs the ISP to release the name and address of the subscriber of services relating to an identified IP address.
126
The identified subscriber is often sent a letter disclosing the information that the ISP will release and directing the individual to contact the issuing court if the individual seeks to quash the subpoena.
127
This initial letter may be enough to scare an individual to settle immediately. 128 Whether the ISP reveals the identity of the user, or the individual contacts the court to quash the subpoena, the plaintiff gains the true identity of the individual and can proceed against him or her.
129
Once the copyright holder knows the identity of the alleged infringer, the holder sends out a settlement letter. 130 The purpose of this letter is to elicit a quick settlement. 131 The letters often cite the 130 Cohen, supra note 12, at 17. 131 Id. Some letters have an increasing settlement amount if the recipient delays before settling. Mike Masnick, Verizon Handing Over Names For US Copyright Group's Mass possibility of statutory damages of up to $150,000 available to a successful plaintiff.
132 While this number is not entirely accurate, 133 it scares many defendants into settling. 134 The individual is then offered the chance to settle for substantially less than the maximum statutory penalty. 135 To facilitate settlement, some plaintiffs have created online payment portals that allow a defendant to settle a claim over the Internet.
136
To elicit a quick settlement, copyright holders rely on the vulnerability of the alleged infringers. 137 Defendants might not be able to hire an attorney or fight the allegations in a court far from home, or they might be embarrassed by the nature of the infringement.
138 This embarrassment factor is notably magnified when the material is pornographic in nature. 139 In the case of popular movies and music, 135 Cohen, supra note 12, at 17 (stating that settlements range from $3000 to $6000); Sandoval, supra note 14 (estimating settlements of $2900). 136 See COPYRIGHT SETTLEMENTS, supra note 14; see also DEFENDANT RECORD ID LOGIN, http://dglegal.force.com/SiteLogindglegal (last visited Feb. 10, 2012) ("All Major Credit Cards Accepted"). embarrassment may still create a strong incentive to settle, even if the accused infringer could argue a persuasive defense. 140 Furthermore, because the cost of representation is often much greater than the cost to settle, many individuals settle despite strong defenses 141 including mistaken identity, 142 procedural violations, 143 or fair use. 144 For example, of the estimated 35,000 people sued by the RIAA over five years, only two cases went to trial. 145 On the other hand, if a defendant does not settle due to a valid defense or because of wrongful identification, the next step is trial. 
The Possibility of Trial
One possible defense at trial is misidentification. 147 Although the information that the plaintiffs gather can identify an ISP subscriber, the identification is not conclusive because the subscriber is not necessarily the infringing party. 148 First, a subscriber can be misshtml (suggesting that many defendants will settle the matter if it relates to pornography to avoid embarrassment). 140 See id. 144 Zelnick, supra note 70. 145 Moseley, supra note 82, at 311, 315. As of September 2010, no Righthaven defendant had chosen to litigate. Zelnick, supra note 70. 146 It has also been suggested that settling can encourage more settlement letters because it shows the individual has the resources to pay and is unwilling to fight. BEING THREATENED?, supra note 99. 147 Tehranian, supra note 88, at 549; ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 103. identified as an infringer without participating in any infringing behavior. 149 Second, IP addresses can be purposefully "framed" by malicious users. 150 Third, there are reliability issues with using IP addresses and timestamps to identify the correct party.
151
For these reasons, there are serious issues around the credibility of the evidence used by copyright trolls.
Despite the defenses to the quality of evidence against alleged infringers, the possibility of losing creates a strong incentive for alleged infringers to avoid a judgment at trial. In the first case brought by the RIAA for sharing music files on the Internet, the defendant, Jammie Thomas-Rasset, argued that an unknown third-party had implicated her IP address by sharing 24 songs.
152
Disbelieving her story, the jury awarded the RIAA $222,000.
153
In the retrial, 154 Thomas-Rasset was represented pro bono.
155
This time, Thomas- Multiple users may share the same IP address and any one of those users can implicate the IP address. Id. Unsecured wireless connections can allow unauthorized users to gain access to the network and the user's activity will be attributable to the IP address of the ISP subscriber.
Id.
149 MICHAEL PIATEK ET AL., CHALLENGES AND DIRECTIONS FOR MONITORING P2P FILE SHARING NETWORKS-OR-WHY MY PRINTER RECEIVED A DMCA TAKEDOWN NOTICE 1 (2008), http://dmca.cs.washington.edu/uwcse_dmca_tr.pdf. The authors were able to receive 403 false positive identification complaints including some sent to a networked printer. Id. at 1-2. However, the authors note that they did not receive pre-settlement letters. Id. at 2. 150 Id. First, a client requesting a download can substitute another IP address for its own to a bittorrent tracker. Id. at 3. Second, a user can also misreport its IP address when uploading a torrent file. Id. Third, a malicious user in the network path between the user monitoring IP address traffic and the bittorrent tracker can implicate another IP address. Id. at 4. Fourth, malware on a user's computer can host and distribute copyrighted content without the users knowledge or consent. Id. 151 Id. When IP addresses are assigned dynamically, reassignment of an IP address from an infringing user to an innocent user can cause the behavior of the infringing user to be attributed to the innocent user. Id. Because the monitoring client (copyright holder) records information from the tracker of the bittorrent client, the information can quickly become inaccurate and will not implicate the correct user. Id. However, it seems that the methods used by Guardaley, who gathered data for DGW, which include actually downloading data from infringers, would give more reliable data than relying on trackers alone. Rasset lost with a jury verdict of $1.92 million. 156 That award was challenged 157 and led to a third trial in which damages of $1.5 million were awarded. 158 For many individuals, the prospect of large damage awards, multiple trials, and the resulting legal fees make a settlement of a few thousand dollars appealing.
Under the current structure of the law, large damage awards are often justified by the nature of the infringement. First, sharing files over peer-to-peer networks is generally not accidental.
159 Second, as DGW claims, sharing files via torrent "requires a fairly complex set of steps to set up" which "adds to the ultimate legal liability of the individual downloader." 160 Therefore, DGW hopes to achieve higher damage awards than the RIAA if cases go to trial because both the length of a film and the cost to create one are greater than for a song. 161 If large awards are justified by the statute, the issue then turns to whether the statute itself is justifiable in the age of Internet copyright trolls.
IV. ADDRESSING THE MASS-LITIGATION BUSINESS MODEL
While there are other solutions that could combat the rise of copyright troll litigation, the best solution to realign the interests of the public with the interests of copyright holders is to remove statutory damages. This Article does not argue that copyright infringement is morally justified or that the law should not protect copyright holders against infringement. Instead, this Article illuminates the incentive structure that leads to copyright holders' misuse of the judicial process to monetize infringement in ways that leave the targets with little choice but to settle. Removing statutory damages for copyright claims is the best policy for furthering the public's interest in copyright protection and relieving the courts, while still protecting the rights of copyright holders.
A. Procedural Solutions Are Insufficient
Some have suggested that procedural changes could reduce the number of targeted individuals and therefore reduce the potential success of abusive litigation-based business models. For example, ISPs could choose not to keep IP address logs. While there might be no legal duty to store IP log data, 162 ISPs might be reluctant to give up those logs for fear of liability 163 and because the data is a potential source of revenue. 164 There might also be business-related reasons for keeping the logs, including monitoring network use, preventing fraud and settling billing disputes.
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A second procedural solution would be for judges to refuse joinder of thousands of defendants in a single suit. If a plaintiff had to sue users individually, the cost to determine each user's identity would increase, 166 encouraging copyright holders to be more selective in choosing defendants. But, it is also possible that plaintiffs would pass 162 See supra note 104. 163 these costs along to defendants in the form of higher settlement requests. 167 Finally, lawyer discipline tribunals could create rules that prevent the unethical devices used in copyright troll suits. 168 Commentators have expressed outcry over the moral repugnancy of these suits. 169 Even before the rise of copyright trolls, Justice Burger wrote that when the public no longer supports the actions taken by lawyers, lawyer behavior needs to change. 170 Recognizing this, the preamble of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that "a lawyer should further the public's . . . confidence in the rule of law . . . because legal institutions . . . depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority." 171 Unfortunately, procedural solutions can only offer limited relief because the prospect of large statutory damage awards would still encourage plaintiffs to find new ways of monetizing infringement.
B. Can We Learn Anything from the Patent Troll Problem?
There is an obvious relation between the copyright troll and the patent troll.
172 Patent trolls purchase the rights to a patent and wait for another company to unsuspectingly infringe on the patent. 173 Patent trolls use the threat of a permanent injunction to force the infringing company to pay high licensing fees. 174 Prior to eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 175 trolls and their victims knew that once infringement was proven, a permanent injunction was automatic. 176 That changed in eBay, where the Court rejected the automatic injunction doctrine and instituted a four-factor test that more accurately measures the actual harm to the plaintiff. 177 Post-eBay injunctions also consider whether the parties are in "direct market competition," which eliminates trolls who do not practice their patents. 178 This furthers the policy of protecting commercially competitive patents, while eliminating incentives for non-practicing entities to "engage in socially costly holdup [s] ." 179 Because permanent injunctions are not the driving force in copyright troll litigation, a different tool is necessary. 180 However, a similar reform strategy, which aims to limit recovery by opportunistic copyright holders, might form a workable solution. In eBay, the Court replaced automatic injunctions that put the patent troll in a superior bargaining position with an equitable solution that considers the legitimate needs of the patent holder. 181 To combat copyright trolls, removing statutory damages would equalize the bargaining position between infringers and copyright holders, yet still allow actual damages when infringement has caused significant, calculable harm.
C. Removing the Incentive: Statutory Damages
Statutory damages are no longer supportable based on their original purpose. The original purpose of statutory damages was to provide compensation when there was uncertainty in determining actual damages. 182 Following this policy rational, early courts interpreting the original 1909 Copyright Act 183 refused to award statutory damages when actual damages could be proven. 184 Because the original policy was that the awards should not be a penalty unless the plaintiff could prove actual damages, courts would either refuse to impose statutory damages or only impose the statutory minimum. 185 Today, some argue that statutory damages are not only intended to compensate, but also to punish. 186 Consider the Jammie ThomasRasset case. 187 Thomas-Rasset was sued for infringing the copyrights of 24 songs, but was sharing 1702 songs at the time. 188 If the damages were calculated at the minimum award of $750 189 for each of the songs she was sharing, the statutory award would be $1,276,500. If we estimate that actual damages are two dollars per song, 190 the ratio of punitive damages to actual damages would be 375:1. This high ratio cannot be explained by a compensatory theory of statutory damages but, rather, suggests that the damages contain a punitive component.
Supreme Court doctrine limiting punitive damages can provide some insight into the proper penalty. Punitive damages with a greater than single-digit multiplier have been struck down by the Court. 191 Were courts to accept the single-digit multiplier doctrine, ThomasRasset's penalty would have been a more palatable $500. 192 While a judge in a bench trial could award damages that are in harmony with this reasoning, plaintiffs have a Seventh Amendment right to having statutory damages determined by a jury. 193 Thomas-Rasset's damages were determined by three juries and the verdicts illustrate that juries do not always view damage awards in the same manner that judges do. 194 Recognizing that copyright on the Internet is unique, commentators have proposed various solutions. 195 One proposed solution would be reductions in the availability of statutory damages combined with levies for Internet use and an inexpensive method of dispute resolution.
"ordinary" infringers differently than "egregious" infringers. 197 Further still, some suggest that statutory damages be removed entirely. 198 Removal of statutory damages is the best remedy for both compensating copyright holders and protecting individuals from copyright troll suits for several reasons. First, actual damages are a more accurate measure of the damage caused by infringement than statutory damages. Second, copyright holders are adequately protected without statutory damages. Most importantly, without statutory damages, copyright trolls would lose the incentive to litigate as a business model. 199 Tautologically, actual damages accurately measure the losses sustained by infringement. The purpose of actual damages are to compensate the plaintiff for provable losses attributable to the defendant's actions. 200 Provable losses can be measured by the diminution of the work's market value as a result of the plaintiff's infringement. 201 This reduction in value is notoriously difficult to quantify but is likely related to the retail value of the work had a license been obtained legally. 202 Taking the highest possible value, this loss can be characterized as one lost sale for a download and one lost many of the flaws in such a system, including the amount of the levy, the possible disruptions to innovation, and that the costs generated by the infringers will be equally carried by those users who do not engage in illegal file sharing. Id. at 1408-09. Lemley and Reese also encourage the use of inexpensive dispute resolution. Id. at 1410-11. They argue that such a system would move litigation away from companies that facilitate infringement, like creators of file sharing software, and allow copyright holders to pursue the individual infringers instead. Id. at 1411. Unfortunately, Lemley and Reese did not take the strategy of mass copyright litigation into account. Although an alternate forum may reduce the strain of these suits on the courts, statutory remedies still allow the plaintiffs to pressure individuals into a quick settlement. See supra Part III.C. 1. sale for an upload of an illegally shared file. 203 This calculation has the effect of assigning greater responsibility to more prolific infringers and lesser responsibility to casual infringers.
Copyright holders are able to adequately protect their interests using actual damages. 204 Actual damages would still give copyright holders an incentive to seek a recovery from infringers who cause significant market damage. On the other hand, individuals who fall below this threshold would appear to be free to infringe. 205 For these individuals, deterrence can still be achieved without statutory damages by measuring damages based on the value to the infringer. 206 The goal of copyright is not to maximize protection, but rather to encourage innovation. 209 While actual damages can in fact remove the incentive to recover minimal losses, this result correctly aligns incentives to sue with the purpose of copyright protection. Moreover, because statutory damages give copyright holders the incentive to litigate over such small losses, removing the incentives would relieve courts from a flood of litigation. 210 Furthermore, plaintiffs could not use the threat of outlandish statutory damages to force settlement and thereby reduce the possibility of negotiation. 211 Without statutory damages, copyright trolls would be reduced to seeking only damages that result from the infringement rather than a windfall recovery when actual damages are minimal. Because the trolls could not legitimately threaten to sue for thousands of dollars per infringement, defendants like Jammie Thomas-Rasset would face penalties that were rationally related to the actual damage they caused.
V. CONCLUSION
In March, 2011, Voltage Pictures, as well as other DGW plaintiffs withdrew their complaints against a total of 10,583 defendants. 212 Voltage Pictures was able to identify 3970 defendants, with more in the process of being produced by ISPs. 213 While some commentators were quick to declare victory for the defendants, 214 a dismissal does not mean those identified are forgotten. 215 Rather, it is more likely that Voltage Pictures will use the information gathered to attempt settlement, and, in the case that an infringer is unwilling to settle, refile the complaint in the infringer's jurisdiction. 216 The courts are faced with the dilemma of enforcing a law meant to compensate for loss, while plaintiffs use the law to monetize infringement. Copyright trolls would continue to use their superior legal position to extract large settlements from casual infringers as long as the law creates fertile ground for mass litigation of copyright troll suits.
Perhaps the best way for the law to adapt to the changing landscape of copyright in the digital age is actually to look to history. Over a century ago, the United Kingdom addressed the issue created by the first copyright troll, Harry Wall. 217 The solution is the same today as it was then: eliminating statutory damages.
218 Viewing Wall's actions as repugnant, Parliament removed automatic statutory penalties from the law.
219
Even if statutory damages are removed, copyright holders would still be able to protect their interests through recovery for actual losses due to infringement, individuals would still be deterred from file sharing through both civil damages and criminal sanctions and the judicial system would no longer be weighed down by cases that contain 24,595 defendants. While copyright holders will resist the removal of statutory damages, legislators should remember that "the primary objective of copyright law is not to reward the author, but rather to secure for the public the benefits derived from the authors'
